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We provide an econometric analysis of whether or not the tariff preferences extended to Canada 
and Mexico under NAFTA may have resulted in trade diversion.  A review of previous studies, both 
descriptive and econometric, suggests that trade diversion has occurred especially as evidenced by 
Mexico’s increased shares of U.S. imports apparently at the expense of several Asian countries.  We use a 
conceptual framework based on a partial-equilibrium model of differentiated product industries under 
monopolistic competition for many countries.  The model is implemented empirically using a fixed-effect 
panel analysis of U.S. imports at the Harmonized System (HS) 2-digit level for the period, 1992-98.  Of 
the 70 sets of regressions that were run, the coefficients of the tariff rates were statistically significant in 
15 cases.  The strongest evidence of trade diversion was found mainly for U.S. imports of textile and 
apparel products.  We also estimated regressions for selected commodities at the HS 4-digit level.  The 
results suggest trade diversion for textiles, apparel, and some footwear products but not for trade in motor 
cars and vehicles and television receivers, which may have been more influenced by changes in foreign 
direct investment and outsourcing rather than tariff preferences. 
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Prior to and since the inception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 
1994, there has been a great deal of interest in policy and academic circles about the impact that 
NAFTA might have on the trade and economic welfare of the NAFTA members – Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States – and nonmembers. In this paper, we investigate the effects of NAFTA on trade 
diversion at a highly disaggregated level of commodity detail. The rationale for this approach is that 
the creation of a preferential trading arrangement like NAFTA involves the interplay of the removal 
of the differential structure of tariffs between member countries and the maintenance of these national 
tariffs with respect to nonmembers. In addition, we know that rules of origin were designed to provide 
special preferences for selected sectors in the NAFTA to the possible detriment of nonmembers. 
  We begin in Section II with a brief review of the complexities of distinguishing the effects of 
NAFTA from the myriad of other forces at work before and following the inception of NAFTA. We 
also discuss the approaches and conclusions of some pertinent studies of the effects of NAFTA. In 
Section III, we discuss the conceptual framework that provides the basis for our analysis and, in 
Section IV, the empirical implementaion of our econometric investigation and a description of the 
data. Our empirical results are reported in Section V. Conclusions and implications for further 
research are presented in Section VI. 
II. NAFTA in Context and a Review of the Literature 
If we were able to do a controlled experiment, we would want to compare the economic situation 
before and after NAFTA was created. Unfortunately, in the social sciences, the ability to construct a 
controlled experiment is typically hampered because other things are happening that will serve to 
confound the design and interpretation of the experiment. Thus, for example, as Krueger (2000, pp. 
762-65) has noted, there are a number of difficulties that arise in evaluating the effects of NAFTA. 
These include: (1) anticipation beginning in 1990 that negotiations would lead to creation of NAFTA; 
(2) the phasing out of NAFTA tariffs over a 10-15 year time period beginning in 1994; (3) trade 
liberalization being undertaken elsewhere at the same time that NAFTA was being implemented; (4)   2
continuing responses to Mexico’s unilateral trade liberalization initiated in the late 1980s; and (5) the 
real appreciation of the Mexican peso from 1987-94 and subsequent depreciation in the course of 
Mexico’s financial crisis in late 1994.
1 Given all of the foregoing currents of change, it is by no means 
an easy matter to isolate the effects of NAFTA. Nonetheless, some efforts have been made that are 
worthy of attention. 
  Gould (1998) used a gravity-model approach in determining how NAFTA may have affected 
the growth of North American trade. The model is estimated in log first differences with aggregated 
bilateral trade flows on a quarterly basis for 1980 through 1996 and measures of real GDP, GDP price 
deflators, real exchange rates, and dummy variables to represent changes in the trade regimes during 
the period involved. His empirical results suggest that, in its first three years: (1) NAFTA may have 
stimulated the growth of U.S. aggregate exports to Mexico but not U.S. imports from Mexico; (2) U.S. 
bilateral trade into Canada and Canadian-Mexican trade were not affected by NAFTA; and (3) trade 
diversion was probably negligible. 
  Krueger (1999b, 2000) examined the changing patterns of trade flows and noted that the trade 
relationships among the NAFTA countries intensified considerably in the 1990s. But she did not find 
much evidence that imports from the rest of the world declined as intra-NAFTA trade increased. 
Krueger also concluded that tariff differentials for U.S. imports from Mexico and East Asia did not 
appear to have changed dramatically. Further, she conducted a “shift in share” analysis and found that 
the increase of Mexico’s share in its trade with the United States was not much different than with the 
rest of the world, reflecting both the impact of Mexico’s unilateral liberalization and the peso 
depreciation after 1994. Finally, on the basis of fitting some gravity equations, she found little 
evidence that trade patterns had been significantly altered by preferential trading arrangements, 
although the results did suggest that NAFTA countries imported less than predicted from nonmember 
countries.
2 On the basis of the foregoing, Krueger concluded that NAFTA was almost certainly trade-
creating rather than trade-diverting.
3 
                                                 
1 See Lustig (2001) for a review of Mexico’s economic performance and policies since 1980. 
2   For more comprehensive studies of preferential trading arrangements using a gravity-model 
approach, see Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Wall (2002). Solaga and Winters find no evidence of   3
  In some earlier work, Krueger (1993, 1999a) called attention to the importance of rules-of-
origin (ROO) as protectionist devices in free trade agreements. In this connection, James and 
Umemoto (1999, 2000) focused attention on the restrictive ROO affecting especially market access in 
NAFTA for textiles and wearing apparel from East Asia. On the basis of examining changes in market 
shares prior to and following the implementation of NAFTA, they concluded that there was prima 
facie evidence of trade diversion. They also examined changes in trade shares of footwear and 
electrical machinery, which were subject to ROO in the NAFTA, and concluded that there was little 
evidence of trade diversion in footwear and none in the case of electrical machinery. James and 
Umemoto present a model of ROO, but they do not implement this model in their empirical analysis 
of changes in trade shares. 
  Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2001) provide a useful survey of the impact of NAFTA 
on the United States that covers both macroeconomic issues and structural adjustments. They point 
out the fallacies in much of the macroeconomic discussion related to NAFTA involving the effects on 
U.S. labor markets, the balance of trade, aggregate employment effects, and the effects of the peso 
crisis. With regard to structural adjustments, they focus on agricultural transition, the rationalization 
of automobile production and parts, and the effects of ROO on textiles and apparel. They note that 
intra-NAFTA trade in agricultural products has risen, and there is evidence that Mexico has taken 
steps to liberalize its agricultural policies and to lock in these reforms. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico had 
significant distortions in its automobile sector, and, with NAFTA, these distortions were phased out. 
                                                                                                                                                        
trade diversion from NAFTA. However, Wall (p. 31) finds that: “… because of the North American 
bloc, total Japanese exports and imports were, respectively, 5.4 percent and 9.2 percent lower, 
implying a 7 percent decrease in Japanese total trade with the world.” Coughlin and Wall (2000) use a 
gravity-model approach in analyzing how NAFTA has changed the pattern of exports of U.S. states to 
foreign geographic destinations. See also Karemara and Ojah (1998) for a gravity-model analysis 
comparing the trade impacts for selected manufactures for the ASEAN members and NAFTA. Their 
data end in 1993, however, so that they do not capture the trade effects following the inception of 
NAFTA in 1994. 
3 Agama and McDaniel (2002) estimate aggregate import-demand functions using quarterly data on 
real exports and imports and U.S. and calculated Mexican tariff rates for 1983-2001. They conclude 
(p. 3) that: “On average, a one percentage point increase in the tariff preference corresponds to 
somewhere between an 11.2 and 16.5 percent increase in U.S. import demand for Mexican goods, and 
an additional 2.4 to 3.8 percent, respectively, during the NAFTA period. On the export side, a one 
percentage point increase in the NAFTA tariff preference corresponds to roughly a 5.1 to 6.7 percent 
increase in Mexico’s demand for U.S. goods.”    4
In negotiating NAFTA, it was specified that vehicles should have a 62.5 percent North American 
content. In response to the phase-out of the Mexican restrictions and implementation of the ROO, 
Burfisher et al. cite evidence of significant rationalization effects in the production of autos and parts 
that have benefited the North American auto industry. However, they do not address the question of 
whether trade diversion has occurred. Finally, with regard to textiles and apparel, Burfisher et al. 
conclude that there is rather clear evidence of trade diversion especially vis-à-vis East Asia, which 
corresponds to what James and Umemoto (1999, 2000) found in their research as noted above. 
  Arndt and Huemer (2001, 2002) provide graphical analyses of the changes in the dollar value 
of U.S. exports and imports and the shares accounted for by Canada, Mexico, and Japan on a quarterly 
basis from 1990-I to 2001-II. Since the inception of NAFTA in 1994, Mexico has displaced Japan as 
the second largest market for U.S. exports while Canada’s share of U.S. exports has remained 
relatively unchanged. What is more striking is that Mexico’s share of U.S. imports has risen from 
around 8 percent in 1994 to 12 percent in 2001, while Japan’s share has fallen from about 18 percent 
to 12 percent in this same period. Arndt and Huemer also depict changes in U.S. imports and import 
shares at the industry level for motor vehicles, television sets, and textiles and apparel. They show that 
Mexico apparently increased its share of U.S. imports of automobiles at the expense of Japan, its 
share of U.S. television imports at the expense of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, and its share of 
U.S. imports of textiles and apparel at the expense of China and other Asian suppliers. Finally, Arndt 
and Huemer provide graphical evidence of the importance of foreign outsourcing from the United 
States to Mexico especially and to Canada for motor vehicles, television sets, and textiles and apparel. 
While this outsourcing predates NAFTA, they show that there has been a significant increase in U.S. 
exports of components to and imports of end products from its NAFTA partners since 1994. Arndt 
and Huemer conclude accordingly that NAFTA has had a significant impact on intra-North American 
trade through the combination of discriminatory tariff reductions resulting in trade diversion and 
through increased outsourcing that reflects the reorganization and relocation of production and the 
exchange of component inputs and end products. 
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  By far the most ambitious and comprehensive study of the trade effects of NAFTA is Romalis 
(2001), which came to our attention after we had completed our own study. Setting out a conceptual 
framework, Romalis develops reduced-form equations in which the shares of U.S. imports of 
commodities sourced from Canada or Mexico depend on the tariff preferences under NAFTA 
extended to the two countries. He makes allowance for the time varying effects of tariff preferences 
by interacting the preferences present in 2000 with annual time dummies.  He also introduces control 
measures for commodity and industry characteristics. Working at the 8-digit Harmonized System 
(HS) level, he tracks U.S. bilateral trade with Canada and Mexico for 6,874 commodities annually 
from 1989 to 2000 and constructs the preferential tariff rates that apply to these commodities. Based 
on his regression results, he finds that NAFTA has had a significant effect on U.S. imports from 
Canada and especially from Mexico. Further, he finds no statistical evidence of trade creation in 
analyzing the growth of U.S. imports of the commodities covered. Romalis concludes therefore that 
NAFTA has been primarily trade diverting. 
  We turn now to our own research, which, as mentioned, will focus on a disaggregated level 
for selected manufactured goods, using a version of the gravity model that may serve to identify the 
presence or absence of trade diversion as the consequence of NAFTA. Our work is related to what 
James and Umemoto and Arndt and Huemer have done descriptively in analyzing intra-NAFTA trade 
and is in the same spirit as Romalis insofar as we use an explicit theoretical model and econometric 
analysis to try to identify the forces at work that have affected NAFTA’s trade. 
III. Conceptual Framework  
In order to illustrate the effects of NAFTA, we focus on how it may have affected the shares of 
member and non-member countries in U.S. imports at a detailed commodity level. For this purpose, 
we have developed a partial-equilibrium trade model of differentiated-product industries under 
monopolistic competition with N countries. The model is patterned after earlier work along these lines   6
by Helpman and Krugman (1985), Markusen (1986), and Bergstrand (1989). The technical details of 
the model can be found in Fukao, Okubo, and Stern (2003).
4   
  According to the model, with product differentiation, the percentage of imports from country 
n in U.S. total imports of industry z products depends on the relative import price (including tariffs) of 
country n’s products in U.S. total imports of industry z products and the variety of products supplied 
by industry z in country n. In the model, the relative import price of country n’s product in U.S. total 
imports is mainly determined by U.S. trade barriers against country n, country n’s relative wage rate, 
and cost of transportation from country n. Because of the free-entry assumption, the variety of 
industry z products supplied by country n is endogenously determined by the zero-profit condition. 
Country n’s variety of industry z products is a decreasing function of this country’s relative wage rate 
and other countries’ trade barriers against this country. It is also an increasing function of this 
country’s endowment of the industry z specific factor, which we assume to be constant over time.  
  In the model, the creation of NAFTA will reduce U.S. imports from non-member countries 
through the following two mechanisms. First, it will increase the relative import price (including 
tariff) of the non-member countries’ product in U.S. total imports in comparison with the import price 
of member countries. Second, it will reduce the variety of industry z products supplied by non-
member countries. The magnitude of the second effect will be greater if the United States is an 
important destination of non-member countries’ exports. Therefore, the percentage of imports from 
country n in U.S. total imports depends on the relative U.S. tariff rate on country n’s products and the 
product of the relative U.S. tariff rate on country n’s products and the percentage of exports of the 
commodity from country n to the United States in the total exports of this country.  
                                                 
4 We had planned initially to develop a structural model that would take into account the demand and 
supply conditions in both NAFTA member and nonmember countries. This would have enabled us to 
distinguish more directly the changes in trade creation and diversion and to assess the welfare effects 
involved. However, because of resource and data constraints, we decided to use a partial-equilibrium 
modeling approach and to focus on changes in the shares of Mexico and Canada and other U.S. 
partner countries in U.S. imports. As will be noted below, our approach abstracts from the possible 
changes in market shares due to shifts in foreign direct investment and outsourcing by U.S. 
multinationals induced by NAFTA. In addition, it may be important to determine the extent to which 
imports into the United States from Mexico and Canada may have displaced U.S. production. But this 
lies outside our model as well.   7
  As indicated in Fukao, Okubo and Stern (2003), the conceptual basis for our empirical 
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where sz,n,1, wn, and Tz,n,1 denote the percentage of imports from country n in U.S. total imports of 
industry z products, country n’s wage rate, and one plus the tariff and tariff equivalent of non-tariff 
barriers of U.S. imports used in the output by industry z in country n. vz,n,1 is the percentage of exports 
of industry z in country n. λz,n depends on country-specific factors such as distance from the United 
States and each country’s endowment of industry-specific production factors εz,n(t) is the usual error 
term. The three elasticity values, λz,1, λz,2, and λz,1, are positive. Using panel data, we can estimate the 
above equation as a fixed-effect model. 
IV. Empirical Implementation  
As stated, our objective is to evaluate the trade-diversion effects from the creation of NAFTA in the 
U.S. import market on the basis of equation (1). For this purpose, we use a fixed-effect panel analysis 
for manufactured commodities at the Harmonized System (HS) 2-digit level from 1992 to 1998. Data 
for 1998 were the latest comprehensive data available at the time of writing. Our regressions cover the 
entire spectrum of U.S. manufactured goods imports, HS 30 to HS 99, for the domain of U.S. trading 
partners.  
From our theoretical analysis, we derived the following equation for regression analysis: 
)) ( ln( )) ( ln( )) ( ln( ) 2 ( 2 , 1 , 0 , t T a t w a a t s n z n z n z + + =  
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0
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of each country’s import share in the U.S. market for 
each commodity in each year.
5 On the right-hand side, the first independent variable is the natural 
logarithm of wage rates in each year in each exporting country. We approximated each exporting 
country’s wage rates by its GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. The second independent variable is the 
natural logarithm of one plus U.S. tariff rates against each exporting country. The third independent 
variable is the product of the percentage of exports of the commodity from each country to the United 
States in total exports of this country in 1991 and the natural logarithm of one plus tariff rates toward 
each export. 
6 According to our theoretical model, we expect negative signs for the coefficients of 
these three variables.
7 In order to control for country-specific factors that are not included in the 
independent variables, such as distance from the United States and each country’s endowment of 
industry-specific production factors, we use country dummies. The time dummies stand for macro 
shocks such as changes in average U.S. tariff rates against all the countries and changes in world GDP. 
The import shares are calculated from the HS 2-digit import data in U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. 
Imports of Merchandise on CD-ROM and U.S. Imports History on CD-ROM. GDP per capita data are 
from the World Development Indicators on CD-ROM 2000 (World Bank). Percentages of each 
country’s exports of each commodity to the United States in total exports of this country are taken 
from Statistics Canada, World Trade Analyzer. Data on bilateral tariff rates are taken from the 
                                                 
5 When one country’s import share is zero, we treated it as a missing observation. Therefore our data 
are an unbalanced panel. If there were some variables that strongly affect the chances for observation 
(non-zero imports) but not the outcome under study, it would be more appropriate to take account of 
the sample-selection process by estimating a selection model, such as Heckman (1979). But in our 
case, there seems to be no such variable. So we did not take account of sample-selection bias. For 
more detail on this issue, see Manning, Duan, and Rogers (1987). 
6 In addition, we considered U.S. NTBs. We used frequency measures of U.S. NTBs in 1993 at the 
HS 4-digit level, obtained from OECD, Indicators of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Trade Barriers 1997. We 
assumed that U.S. NTBs against all the countries were identical and constant until 1993, and that the 
NTBs against Canada and Mexico became zero after 1994. Therefore, our NTB variables were almost 
identical with the NAFTA dummy variables. As a consequence, we do not report below the results 
using the NTB measures. 
7 The question arises as to whether using import shares as the dependent variable is the best way of 
getting at trade diversion. That is, changes in import shares may be influenced by a variety of 
structural factors on both the supply and demand sides that, as noted above, are not being taken into 
account in the model.    9
TRAINS dataset of UNCTAD.
8  The data at the 2-digit level are compiled by taking a weighted 
average of 6-digit HS tariff rates, using U.S. import shares of each 6-digit HS commodity in 1991 as 
weights.  
As we will report in the next section, az,3, the estimated coefficients of the product of the 
percentage of exports of the commodity from each country to the United States in total exports of this 
country in 1991 and the natural logarithm of one plus tariff rates toward each export are not 
significant and do not have the expected negative sign in many commodities. Because of this we have 
also estimated the following equation, which does not include this variable: 
)) ( ln( )) ( ln( )) ( ln( ) 3 ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 0 1 , , t T a t w a a t s n z n z n z + + =  
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ε + + + ∑ ∑  
Both reductions in tariff rates among NAFTA countries and removal of NTBs might have 
trade-diversion effects. In order to check this, we replaced the tariff variables with a NAFTA dummy 
in equation (4) below. The NAFTA dummy takes value one for Canada and Mexico after the creation 
of NAFTA in 1994. In order to take account of the fact that NAFTA trade barriers are phased out 
gradually over time, we also used a lagged NAFTA dummy in equation (5), which takes value one for 
Canada and Mexico after 1995:  
) ( )) ( ln( )) ( ln( ) 4 ( 2 , 1 , 0 , t NAFTADUM a t w a a t s n z n z n z + + =  
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We expect positive signs for coefficients of the NAFTA dummy and the lagged NAFTA dummy. 
The above equations (2)—(5) were estimated by OLS with fixed effects with a 
correction for first-order autocorrelation in the disturbances. It should be noted that there is a 
                                                 
8 Data on tariff rates are available at 6-digit HS for 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1998. We have used 1993 
tariff rates for 1992. Tariff rates for 1995 and 1997 are calculated as the average of 1994 and 1996 
and 1996 and 1998, respectively.    10
possibility that industries defined by HS 2-digit codes might be too broad and include too 
many commodities with different characteristics. To take this into account, we have also 
estimated the above equations for selected industries at the HS 4-digit level from 1992 to 
1998.  
V. Empirical Results 
As mentioned above, we estimated regression equations for the HS 2-digit U.S. imports of 
manufactured goods for the period, 1992-98. There were 60 sets of regressions that were run. It turned 
out that the coefficients of the tariff rates were statistically significant in 15 of the 60 cases. The 
results for these 15 cases are reported in boldface in table 1.
9  
For the 15 commodities noted in table 1, the coefficients of tariff rates were negative and 
significant at the 5% level in either equation (2) or (3). In most cases, these coefficients were 
generally greater than 20. When this coefficient takes a value 20, it means that a 5% reduction of U.S. 
tariff rates on imports from one country will double that country’s share in U.S. total imports. 
Therefore, our results suggest that tariff rates have significant effects on U.S. trade in the case of these 
commodities.  
We should note that for a substantial number of commodities, such as pharmaceutical 
products and electric machinery, U.S. tariff rates on imports from Canada and Mexico were negligible 
even before 1994. In these cases, we cannot argue that NAFTA had a significant trade-diversion effect. 
Table 2 shows U.S. tariff rates on imports of the fifteen commodities from Canada and Mexico in 
1993 and 1996. For six of the fifteen categories, indicated in boldface, U.S. tariff rates on imports 
from either Canada or Mexico were greater than 2.5% in 1993. Probably we can infer relatively large 
trade-diversion effects in these uses. 
                                                 
9 The estimated coefficients of GDP, country dummies, and time dummies are not reported because of 
space limitations but are available from the authors on request. The coefficients of the NAFTA 
dummies and lagged NAFTA dummies were either insignificant or had unexpected signs in most 
cases. Only in the cases of HS 43 (Furskins), HS 50 (Silk), and HS 60 (Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics) 
were the lagged NAFTA dummies positive and significant at the 5% level.   11
To clarify matters in more detail, figure 1 shows U.S. tariff rates on imports from Canada, 
Mexico, and the rest of the world and the two NAFTA country shares in U.S. imports for each of 
these 6 commodities. It would appear that for textiles and apparel products, which include HS 51 
Wool & Animal Hair, including Yarn & Woven Fabric, HS 52 Cotton, including Yarn and Woven 
Fabric Thereof, HS 60 Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics, and HS 62 Apparel Articles and Accessories, 
Not Knit etc., U.S. tariff rates towards Canada and Mexico were reduced considerably after 1994. On 
the other hand, U.S. tariff rates towards the non-NAFTA countries remained relatively high during the 
period. Reflecting these discriminatory tariff cuts, the shares of Canada and Mexico in U.S. imports 
increased substantially. For the other two commodity categories, HS 46 Mfr of Straw and HS 79 Zinc, 
although U.S. tariff rates towards Canada and Mexico were reduced after 1994, the tariff rates 
towards the non-NAFTA countries were also reduced. We do not observe therefore substantial 
increases in the Canadian or Mexican shares in U.S. imports in these two cases. We conclude 
therefore, based on figure 1 and our regression results in table 1, that the creation of NAFTA had 
significant trade-diversion effects on U.S. imports mainly in the cases of textile and apparel products. 
As already mentioned, it is possible that commodities defined by HS 2-digit codes might be 
too broad and include too many commodities with different characteristics to permit rigorous analysis. 
To take this into account, we have also estimated our equations for selected commodities at the HS 4-
digit level from 1992 to 1998. The commodities have been selected following James and Umemoto 
(1999, 2000), who focused on such labor-intensive goods as textiles, apparel, leather products and 
footwear, and electronic products. We also included motor cars and vehicles since these were subject 
to a rule of origin as noted earlier. The specific 4-digit commodities that we selected are as follows:  
HS 4202 Travel Goods, Handbags, Wallets, Jewelry Cases, Etc. 
HS 6002 Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics, NES 
HS 6109 T-Shirts, Singlets, Tank Tops, Etc., Knit or Crochet 
HS 6115 Pantyhose, Socks & Other Hosiery, Knit or Crochet 
HS 6401 Waterproof Footwear, Rubber or Plastic, Bond Sole 
HS 8529 TV Receivers, Incl. Video Monitors & Projectors 
HS 8703 Motor Cars & Vehicles for Transporting Persons 
In order to take account of the fact that NAFTA tariffs are being phased out gradually over 
time, we also used a lagged NAFTA dummy, which takes the value one for Canada and Mexico after   12
1995. In the case of automobile trade, the United States had already liberalized its imports from 
Canada prior to NAFTA. To take account of this, we used a Mexico dummy, which takes the value 
one for Mexico after 1994 for regressions for “motor cars and vehicles.” 
Before evaluating the regression results, we provide in figures 2 and 3 an overview of U.S. 
tariff rates and imports from NAFTA and non-NAFTA countries for the seven commodities defined 
by the HS 4-digit codes that we have selected. For almost all commodities, Canada and Mexico 
received substantial tariff margins of preference after NAFTA, and it can be seen that NAFTA tariffs 
were phased out gradually over time. We should further note that tariff rates were very low in the 
cases of “TV receivers” and “motor cars.” It appears from figure 2 that, in the cases of apparel, such 
as “T-shirts” and “socks,” and “TV receivers” and “motor vehicles,” Mexico increased its share in 
U.S. imports more substantially than Canada. Canada gained more in “travel goods” and “waterproof 
footwear.”  
The regression results are reported in detail in table 3 and summarized in table 4. It is evident 
that both tariff rates and the NAFTA dummies are significant in general. For “travel goods” and 
“motor cars,” neither variable is significant.
10 For “socks,” only the NAFTA dummy is significant. 
For “TV receivers,” only tariff rates are significant. For many commodities, GDP per capita is 
insignificant or has an unexpected positive sign. 
It thus appears from these more disaggregated results that NAFTA has resulted in significant 
trade diversion especially in textiles, apparel, and some footwear products. Since U.S. tariff rates were 
relatively low in the cases of “TV receivers” and “motor cars,” and since it may be the case that 
foreign direct investment and outsourcing are important in these industries, the changes in import 
shares noted may reflect these determinants, which lie outside the focus of our model.  
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Further Research 
In this paper, we have developed and implemented a framework for analyzing how tariff preferences 
in the NAFTA may affect U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico. Based on trade and tariff 
                                                 
10  Probably, we obtained insignificant results in the case of “travel goods” because this category 
covers too many different types of commodities.    13
information at the 2-digit and 4-digit levels of the Harmonized System, our econometric analysis has 
suggested that NAFTA has resulted in trade diversion especially in U.S. imports of textiles and 
apparel products from Mexico. Evidence based on other studies suggests that these imports have come 
at the expense especially of Asian suppliers. 
  Our research and some of the other studies that we have noted demonstrate the importance of 
commodity disaggregation in analyzing the effects of preferential trading arrangements as well as the 
need to consider how foreign direct investment and outsourcing may have interacted with tariff 
preferences in influencing patterns of trade and specialization in the NAFTA and non-NAFTA 
countries.   14
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HS Code Definition Tariff
Share
Tariff







t-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value
-35.43 -31.68 366 -17.57 538 0.37 632 0.46 632
(-3.13) (-0.39) 2.25 (-1.78) 1.11 (0.44) 1.51 (0.61) 1.53
0.58 599 0.37 599
(0.70) 0.79 (0.49) 0.76
Tanning & Dye Ext etc; 23.49 -149.775 428 7.47 614 0.12 634 0.20 634
Dye, Paint, Putty etc; Inks (2.74) (-3.69) 2.95 (1.06) 1.16 (0.16) 0.88 (0.30) 0.88
Essential Oils etc; -4.94 3.53 486 5.61 718 0.55 741 0.59 741
Perfumery, Cosmetic etc Preps (-0.61) (0.11) 0.75 (0.74) 0.91 (0..81) 1.17 (0.96) 1.20
Soap etc; Waxes, Polish etc; 45.30 24.08 465 18.07 647 0.20 667 0.33 667
Candles; Dental Preps (4.33) (0.47) 3.71 (2.42) 1.22 (0.27) 0.76 (0.48) 0.78
Albuminoidal Subst; Modified Starch; -20.49 206.70 319 3.76 632 0.33 650 0.28 650
Glue; Enzymes (-1.15) (2.06) 0.66 (0.31) 1.28 (0.50) 1.29 (0.47) 1.29
Explosives; Pyrotechnics;
Matches; Pyro Alloys etc
-38.10 -466.37 306 -16.57 537 -0.07 588 0.02 588
(-2.23) (-2.14) 3.45 (-1.68) 1.52 (-0.09) 0.85 (0.03) 0.85
-6.64 22.42 338 -11.26 580 -0.38 596 -0.37 596
(-0.34) (0.20) 1.49 (-0.86) 2.68 (-0.56) 2.24 (-0.60) 2.25
-2.60 -121.99 576 -7.31 790 0.28 791 0.35 791
(-0.20) (-1.46) 1.52 (-1.22) 0.99 (0.38) 0.81 (0.52) 0.83
-4.74 30.82 479 -1.62 698 0.41 716 0.44 716
(-0.32) (0.48) 2.99 (-0.14) 2.86 (0.53) 2.89 (0.62) 2.90
Raw Hides and Skins 26.47 -67.98 488 0.59 702 0.52 722 0.49 722
(No Furskins) and Leather (1.61) (-0.24) 1.71 (0.05) 2.19 (0.59) 2.16 (0.61) 2.16
Leather Art; Saddlery etc; -1.84 5.31 628 12.42 781 0.41 782 0.42 782
Handbags etc; Gut Art (-0.10) (0.14) 0.98 (1.27) 0.81 (0.54) 0.63 (0.60) 0.64
Furskins and Artificial Fur; -7.96   677     1.43 695 1.46 695
Manufactures Thereof (-1.02)   2.05     (1.84) 1.94 (2.06) 2.05
Wood and Articles of Wood; -69.71 181.05 636 -43.89 814 -0.27 834 -0.20 834
Wood Charcoal (-3.93) (1.22) 4.03 (-2.93) 2.92 (-0.46) 1.97 (-0.37) 1.96
-183.42 254.84 139 -11.17 680 -0.10 755 -0.02 755
(-4.50) (0.90) 3.62 (-0.75) 0.26 (-0.14) 0.46 (-0.03) 0.46
Mfr of Straw, Esparto etc.; -17.07 82.79 351 -3.48 668 -0.36 670 -0.29 670
Basketware & Wickerwrk (-1.98) (3.26) 2.09 (-0.65) 1.72 (-0.56) 1.70 (-0.50) 1.69
Wood Pulp etc;  -0.03 656 0.10 656
Recovd (Waste & Scrap) Ppr & Pprbd (-0.04) 1.24 (0.14) 1.24
Paper & Paperboard & Articles -65.11 562.94 484 -0.83 634 0.28 707 0.40 707
(Inc Papr Pulp Artl) (-1.36) (0.88) 0.67 (-0.03) 0.86 (0.44) 0.99 (0.68) 1.02
Printed Books, Newspapers etc; -330.47 156.36 483 -203.63 721 0.13 789 0.17 789
Manuscripts etc (-3.72) (0.40) 2.66 (-3.35) 2.25 (0.22) 0.85 (0.30) 0.86
Equation 4 Equation 5
Plastics and Articles Thereof
Rubber and Articles Thereof
Equation 2 Equation 3
Pharmaceutical Products
Fertilizers
Photographic or Cinematographic Goods
Miscellaneous Chemical Products





















   HS Code Definition Tariff
Share
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t-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value
Silk, including Yarns and 8.29 -64.12 292 -5.56 635 2.09 648 1.63 648
Woven Fabric Thereof (0.76) (-1.27) 1.61 (-0.82) 0.93 (2.39) 1.61 (2.16) 1.48
Wool & Animal Hair, -91.60 43.55 358 -10.06 663 0.53 664 0.64 664
including Yarn & Woven Fabric (-3.73) (3.21) 2.79 (-1.36) 1.44 (0.74) 1.28 (0.98) 1.33
Cotton, -35.17 46.93 502 -31.52 715 0.91 716 1.06 716
including Yarn and Woven Fabric Thereof (-1.10) (0.59) 1.79 (-2.85) 2.15 (1.06) 1.25 (1.36) 1.34
Veg Text Fib Other;
Veg Fib & Paper Yns & Wov Fab
Manmade Filaments, -0.83 -16.46 345 -5.00 650 0.12 651 0.30 651
including Yarns & Woven Fabrics (-0.04) (-1.11) 1.67 (-0.48) 1.94 (0.14) 1.92 (0.38) 1.94
Manmade Staple Fibers, -36.75 44.27 448 -9.26 638 0.40 639 0.48 639
including Yarns & Woven Fabrics (-0.70) (0.59) 1.43 (-1.19) 3.72 (0.53) 3.58 (0.70) 3.60
Wadding, Felt etc; SP Yarn; -6.43 -8.74 421 -22.08 649 0.07 650 0.29 650
Twine, Ropes etc. (-0.26) (-0.81) 0.75 (-1.25) 1.09 (0.08) 0.90 (0.39) 0.92
-86.97 4.18 266 -24.90 687 0.41 688 0.48 688
(-1.49) (0.15) 1.59 (-1.24) 2.55 (0.61) 2.40 (0.79) 2.43
Spec Wov Fabrics; Tufted Fab; 1.09 -23.48 487 -8.83 666 0.70 667 0.86 667
Lace; Tapestries etc. (0.03) (-0.61) 1.05 (-0.87) 1.40 (1.00) 1.43 (1.34) 1.53
Impregnated etc Text Fabrics; 9.57 -22.42 356 7.48 603 0.13 604 0.22 604
Tex Art for Industry (0.45) (-0.70) 1.02 (0.52) 0.60 (0.16) 0.57 (0.30) 0.57
-89.64 86.33 377 -10.49 584 1.17 585 1.43 585
(-3.56) (2.58) 4.40 (-1.24) 4.44 (1.45) 4.50 (1.94) 4.72
Apparel Articles and Accessories, -38.36 37.05 646 -5.43 868 0.91 869 0.97 869
Knit or Crochet (-1.47) (1.02) 0.81 (-0.93) 0.91 (1.19) 0.99 (1.39) 1.05
Apparel Articles and Accessories, -56.69 65.50 678 -8.57 927 0.16 928 0.21 928
Not Knit etc. (-2.86) (2.55) 2.29 (-1.37) 6.76 (0.22) 6.53 (0.31) 6.54
Textile Art Other; -13.09 6.20 600 1.34 813 0.06 814 0.11 814
Needlecraft Sets; Worn Text Art (-0.64) (0.20) 0.59 (0.13) 0.49 (0.09) 0.49 (0.17) 0.49
Footwear, Gaiters etc. 14.64 -41.46 448 -5.56 737 0.48 738 0.50 738
and Parts Thereor (0.46) (-0.90) 1.96 (-0.71) 1.30 (0.62) 1.29 (0.70) 1.31
-17.16 38.91 523 -10.51 737 0.26 738 0.28 738
(-0.78) (1.08) 2.50 (-0.98) 1.59 (0.33) 1.48 (0.40) 1.49
Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, -12.92 45.99 376 -12.80 573 0.32 637 0.40 637
Riding-Crops etc. Parts (-1.61) (1.25) 0.91 (-2.42) 1.79 (0.36) 1.20 (0.50) 1.22
Prep Feathers, Down etc;
Artif Flowers; H Hair Art
Art of Stone, Plaster, Cement, 4.04 -19.57 469 -13.01 665 0.37 681 0.40 681
Asbestos, Mica etc. (0.44) (-0.18) 1.44 (-1.85) 2.61 (0.59) 2.31 (0.70) 2.33
-3.81 8.85 426 -6.00 699 0.44 720 0.46 720
(-0.66) (0.75) 1.30 (-1.49) 0.74 (0.70) 0.53 (0.80) 0.55
 
Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
Carpets and Other Textile Floor Coverings
Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics
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t-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value
1.36 -4.56 477 -4.47 686 0.16 687 0.18 687
(0.10) (-0.12) 0.63 (-0.72) 0.63 (0.25) 0.57 (0.30) 0.58
Nat etc Pearls, Prec etc Stones, 52.68 -162.21 598 18.36 821 0.23 847 0.31 847
PR Met etc; Coin (2.96) (-3.59) 2.19 (1.60) 1.50 (0.34) 1.40 (0.51) 1.42
33.58 5.74 487 21.83 743 -0.08 764 -0.005 764
(2.21) (0.13) 1.96 (1.78) 2.05 (-0.10) 1.62 (-0.01) 1.62
-9.48 9.99 528 -2.83 716 0.27 738 0.26 738
(-0.75) (0.25) 1.22 (-0.32) 1.45 (0.45) 1.36 (0.47) 1.37
82.19 -75.60 480 15.63 711 0.37 732 0.49 732
(4.28) (-1.56) 3.74 (1.09) 1.66 (0.53) 1.57 (0.79) 1.61
199.76 -149.94 318 -35.00 588 -0.26 650 0.01 650
(1.42) (-0.52) 1.28 (-0.41) 0.71 (-0.34) 0.57 (0.01) 0.56
13.36 10.93 429 16.92 678 -0.47 700 -0.33 700
(0.64) (0.05) 3.45 (1.21) 4.37 (-0.67) 4.25 (-0.51) 4.23
 
-26.56 -76.10 244 -5.93 534 -0.34 591 -0.05 591
(-1.16) (-0.34) 1.08 (-0.35) 0.98 (-0.40) 1.46 (-0.06) 1.44
-64.66 29.62 256 -20.09 568 -0.14 586 -0.07 586
(-1.96) (0.77) 1.33 (-1.29) 1.44 (-0.17) 1.09 (-0.09) 1.09
 
Base Metals Other; Cermets; -37.87 60.31 295 -21.45 562 -0.41 576 -0.35 576
Articles Thereof (-1.33) (0.80) 1.25 (-1.60) 0.93 (-0.58) 0.67 (-0.55) 0.67
Tools, Cutlery etc. of  -31.37 -12.65 434 -5.26 640 0.26 659 0.20 659
Base Metal & Parts Thereof (-2.90) (-0.16) 1.52 (-0.89) 0.93 (0.39) 0.86 (0.33) 0.86
Miscellaneous Articles of -15.10 -25.77 333 10.10 649 0.31 668 0.38 668
Base Metal (-1.75) (-0.62) 1.84 (1.48) 1.00 (0.45) 0.84 (0.60) 0.87
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery etc.; 3.74 149.08 648 -4.95 863 0.08 888 0.17 888
Parts (0.30) (1.25) 1.61 (-0.52) 2.92 (0.12) 2.93 (0.26) 2.94
Electric Machinery etc; Sound Equip; -26.60 218.66 650 -13.75 855 0.02 881 0.19 881
TV Equip; Pts (-2.67) (1.86) 2.69 (-1.83) 4.06 (0.02) 3.78 (0.29) 3.79
Railway or Tramway Stock etc;
Traffic Signal Equip
Vehicles, Except Railway or Tramway, -1.23 17.95 502 8.96 704 0.52 724 0.62 724
and Parts etc (-0.10) (0.60) 0.67 (0.81) 2.19 (0.67) 2.68 (0.87) 2.72
Aircraft, Spacecraft, 
and Parts Thereof
-48.10 -63.96 299 -30.43 498 0.02 551 0.26 551
(-1.03) (-0.34) 0.77 (-1.19) 0.79 (0.02) 0.47 (0.30) 0.49
 
Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5
Glass and Glassware
Iron and Steel
Articles of Iron or Steel
Copper and Articles Thereof
Nickel and Articles Thereof
Aluminum and Articles Thereof









79 Zinc and Articles Thereof
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t-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value t-value F-value
Optic, Photo etc,  -11.46 -2.78 583 -17.36 755 0.14 778 0.09 778
Medic or Surgical Instruments etc. (-1.76) (-0.08) 1.49 (-3.67) 4.28 (0.23) 2.23 (0.16) 2.23
Clocks and Watches and Parts Thereof 14.63 13.66 443 12.03 637 -0.29 657 -0.32 657
(1.50) (0.69) 0.86 (1.41) 0.77 (-0.35) 0.78 (-0.41) 0.79
Musical Instruments; -3.60 60.43 421 5.71 640 -0.11 659 0.01 659
Parts and Accessories Thereof (-0.39) (0.61) 1.06 (1.04) 1.96 (-0.16) 1.88 (0.01) 1.88
Arms and Ammunition;
Parts and Accessories Thereof
Furniture; Bedding etc; -8.53 90.87 589 0.48 779 0.18 780 0.26 780
Lamps Other etc; Prefab BD -1.51 2.28 1.66 (0.12) 0.90 (0.32) 0.92 (0.51) 0.94
Toys, Games & Sport Equipment; -7.75 24.84 436 -6.46 749 0.55 773 0.56 773
Parts & Accessories (-1.76) (1.16) 2.09 (-1.82) 3.38 (0.85) 2.82 (0.96) 2.85
Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces
and Antiques












Special Classification Provisions, Other
Special Import Provisions, Other
 †
HS 46 HS 46 Mfr of Straw, Esparto etc.; Basketware & Wickerwrk
HS 51 Wool & Animal Hair, including Yarn & Woven Fabric
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䵥硩捯HS 60 Knitted or Crocheted Fabrics
HS 62 Apparel Articles and Accessories, Not knit etc.
HS 79 Zinc and Articles Thereof
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Wood and Articles of Wood; 93 0.53 0.26
Wood Charcoal 96 0.08 0.10
93 0.00 0.00
96 0.00 0.00
Mfr of Straw, Esparto etc.; 93 0.00 3.01
Basketware & Wickerwrk 96 0.00 0.00
Printed Books, Newspapers etc; 93 0.00 0.00
Manuscripts etc 96 0.00 0.00
Wool & Animal Hair, 93 11.03 15.75
including Yarn & Woven Fabric 96 1.01 3.23
Cotton,  93 4.57 8.98
including Yarn and Woven Fabric Thereof 96 0.88 2.65
93 6.66 13.33
96 1.33 4.55
Apparel Articles and Accessories, 93 6.70 12.93
Not Knit etc. 96 1.23 3.19
Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, 93 0.05 0.00
Riding-Crops etc. Parts 96 0.01 0.00
93 2.01 2.69
96 0.35 0.00
Tools, Cutlery etc. of  93 1.16 0.22
Base Metal & Parts Thereof 96 0.24 0.04
Electric Machinery etc; Sound Equip; 93 0.28 0.56
TV Equip; Pts 96 0.14 0.05
Optic, Photo etc,  93 1.31 0.05
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U.S. Tariff Rates  
Pharmaceutical Products
Photographic or Cinematographic Goods
Cork and Articles of Cork
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 Table 3.  Regression Results: Selected HS 4-Digit Commodities
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 Table 4.  Summary of Regression Results of Table 3
Commodities Tariff NAFTA or NAFTA(Lag)
4202           TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS, WALLETS, JEWELRY CASES ETC ††‭ †††††‭
6002           KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS, OTHER   ††⨪ †††††‪
6109           T-SHIRTS, SINGLETS, TANK TOPS ETC, KNIT OR CROCHET  ††‪ †††††⨪
6115           PANTYHOSE, SOCKS & OTHER HOSIERY, KNIT OR CROCHET ††‭ †††††⨪
6401           WATERPROOF FOOTWEAR, RUBBER OR PLASTICS, BOND SOLE ††⨪ †††††⨪
8528           TV RECVRS, INCL VIDEO MONITORS & PROJECTORS      ††⨪ †††††‭
8703           MOTOR CARS & VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORTING PERSONS ††‭ †††††‭
    Figure 2.  U.S. Tariff Rates: Selected HS 4-Digit Commodities
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     Figure 3. U.S. Imports: Selected HS 4-Digit Commodities
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